Procedural Prerequisites to Private Suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by Waintroob, Andrea
Procedural Prerequisites to Private Suit Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967' (ADEA)
is designed to promote the employment of older persons2 by prohib-
iting employers from making hiring decisions based on arbitrary
discrimination against age.' The substantive provisions4 are en-
forceable both by governmental actions5 and by private suits
brought by persons who have been injured under the terms of the
statute.' The Act requires the Secretary of Labor to seek elimination
of the allegedly discriminatory practice "through informal methods
of conciliation, conference and persuasion ' 7 before formal adversary
proceedings can be instituted. In order to provide time to attempt
this conciliation, an aggrieved individual is required to notify the
Secretary that he intends to sue sixty days before bringing an ac-
tion.'
Two additional procedural requirements imposed by the Act on
private litigants have been the subjects of conflicting judicial inter-
pretation and application. Section 626(d) (1) requires that the sixty-
day notice of intent to sue be filed with the Secretary within 180
days after the allegedly discriminatory act occurred.' Section 633,
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970).
2 The Act extends protection to persons aged 40-64. Id. § 631.
3 The Act is also designed to promote the education of employers and the general public
as to the employment capabilities of older persons. Id. § 622.
' The specific prohibitions are enumerated at id. § 623. Pursuant to § 623(c), labor
unions are under the same obligations as employers.
3 Section 626(b) of the ADEA authorizes suits by the Secretary of Labor in accordance
with the provisions of §§ 16(c) & 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c),
217 (1970).
I Id. § §626(b), (c) (1970). The § 626(b) action is to be brought according to the provisions
of § 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 16(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
7 Id. § 626(d). See also id. §§ 621(b), 626(b), which make it clear that the Act is
designed to promote informal conciliation of disputes whenever possible. The congressional
policy of promoting voluntary compliance is also reflected in the design of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1964). See Developments in the
Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L.
REv. 1109, 1195-99 (1971).
29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970).
29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970) provides:
No civil action may be commenced by any individual under this section until the
individtial has given the Secretary not less than sixty days' notice of an intent to file
such action. Such notice shall be filed-
(1) within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful practice
occurred, or
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the "federal-state relationship" provision, forbids a private ADEA
suit until sixty days after the commencement of any proceedings
instituted under a state age discrimination act. 10
Most courts that have considered the 180-day notice require-
ment have characterized it as a jurisdictional prerequisite to private
suit under the ADEA.1 Courts have not, however, agreed on the
consequences of this characterization. Several courts have suggested
that they have the power to toll or waive the requirement even
though it is "jurisdictional. ' 12 Recently, the Tenth Circuit in Dartt
v. Shell Oil Co. 13 rejected the jurisdictional characterization and
held that the requirement is analogous to a statute of limitations,
thus allowing courts to invoke equitable modifications such as toll-
ing and estoppel."
(2) in a case to which section 633(b) of this title applies, within three hundred
days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred or within thirty days after receipt
by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings under State law, whichever
is earlier.
Upon receiving a notice of intent to sue, the Secretary shall promptly notify all persons
named therein as prospective defendants in the action and shall promptly seek to elimi-
nate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and
persuasion.
10 29 U.S.C. § 633 (1970) provides:
(a) Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of any agency of any State
performing like functions with regard to discriminatory employment practices on ac-
count of age except that upon commencement of action under this chapter such action
shall supersede any State action.
(b) In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a law
prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing
a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice, no suit may
be brought under section 626 of this title before the expiration of sixty days after proceed-
ings have been commenced under the State law unless such proceedings have been
earlier terminated ....
" See Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1975); Hiscott v. General Elec.
Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975); Edwards v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc., 515 F.2d
1195 (5th Cir. 1975); Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974); Brohl
v. Singer Co., 407 F. Supp. 936 (M.D. Fla. 1976); Raynor v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 400
F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Va. 1975); Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 382 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Mich. 1974);
Oshiro v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 80 (D. Hawaii 1974); Gebhard v. GAF
Corp., 59 F.R.D. 504 (D.D.C. 1973); Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973);
Cochran v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 376 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. La. 1971).
11 See Edwards v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc., 515 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1975)
(dictum suggesting that the period may be tolled); McCrickard v. Acme Visible Records, 409
F. Supp. 341, 343 (W.D. Va. 1976) ("While courts have taken different viewpoints as to the
appropriate severity to invoke in applying this provision, the majority view appears to be that
the requirement is jurisdictional and should not be overlooked lightly."); Bishop v. Jelleff
Assocs., Inc., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974) (suggesting period may be waived); Price v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6662 (E.D. Miss. 1972) (suggesting period may be
waived by the consent of defendant).
13 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S.Ct. 1097 (1977).
"4 Id. at 1260-61.
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Judicial interpretations of the federalism provision of the
ADEA have also been inconsistent. It is unclear whether section 633
requires an aggrieved individual initially to file a complaint with the
appropriate state authorities 5 or simply provides the state authori-
ties sixty days to handle complaints that have been brought to them
voluntarily."6 Courts that have held that the section requires initial
state filing have disagreed as to whether this is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit.' Courts that interpret the requirement to make
state filing elective must determine whether section 626(d) (2) of the
Act, which modifies the period for notifying the Secretary of the
intention to sue "in a case to which section 633(b) . . . applies,' ' '8
affects all private complainants in states with age discrimination
laws or only those who have filed state complaints.
This comment explores the conflicting interpretations of these
sections and suggests resolutions.
I. SECTION 626(d) (1)
A. The Nature of the Problem: Characterizing Procedural Time
Requirements
The basic controversy surrounding the 180-day notice require-
ment of section 626(d)(1) is whether it is a jurisdictional prerequis-
ite to suit, or analogous to a statutue of limitations.'9 If the section
is viewed as a jurisdictional prerequisite, a plaintiffs failure to com-
" See Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1975); Goger v. H.K. Porter
Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974); Smith v. Crest Communities, Inc., 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7334
(W.D. Ky. 1974).
When the section is interpreted to mandate state filing, the court must determine what
characteristics a state law must possess before the section requires filing. See Garces v. Sagner
Int'l Inc., 534 F.2d 987 (1st Cir. 1976); Eklund v. Lubrizol Corp., 529 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1976);
Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1975); Hadfield v. Mitre Corp., 422 F.
Supp. 460 (D. Mass. 1976); Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D.
Ill. 1976); Vazquez v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353 (D.P.R. 1975).
1' See Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Smith
v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 419 F. Supp. 770 (D.N.J. 1976); Vazquez v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
405 F. Supp. 1353 (D.P.R. 1975); Skoglund v. Singer Co., 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975).
" Compare Skoglund v. Singer Co., 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975) (requirement not
jurisdictional) with Goger v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974).
, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (1970); see note 9 supra.
' See text and notes at notes 11-14 supra. The problem of determining whether a proce-
dural requirement goes to the jurisdiction of the court is not unique to the ADEA. See, e.g.,
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). In Fauntleroy, Mr. Justice Holmes wrote: "Whether
a given statute is intended simply to establish a rule of substantive law, and thus to define
the duty of the court, or is meant to limit its power, is a question of construction and common
sense." Id. at 235. See also Burnet v. Desmornes, 226 U.S. 145 (1912) (Holmes, J.).
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ply in theory results in an absolute bar to suit."0 Because a jurisdic-
tional defect destroys a court's power to hear a case, 2 a court cannot
examine the circumstances surrounding a plaintiff's noncompliance
to determine whether equitable considerations warrant keeping the
suit alive. 22 By contrast, noncompliance with a statute of limitations
does not end judicial power to hear the case; a residuum of equitable
power remains.? A court can review the circumstances surrounding
the plaintiff's noncompliance and decline to dismiss the case by
finding, for example, that the limitation period has been tolled,2 4 or
that the defendant's conduct estops him from invoking the expired
time limit as an affirmative defense.2 5 A court might also find that
the defendant has waived the statute of limitations.2 6 In short, time
20 See text and note at note 12 supra.
21 Federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, "have only that jurisdiction which
Congress, acting within the limits of the Constitution, confers upon them." 1 MooRE's FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 0.60, at 608 (2d ed. 1976). The limit on jurisdiction is clear: "[i]f there is
no statutory grant, federal jurisdiction is lacking, for. . . parties cannot confer jurisdiction
upon a federal court by consent." Id. 0.60[2], at 605. A jurisdictional prerequisite to suit
is an absolute requirement because, if the plaintiff fails to comply with its terms, a condition
of the statutory grant of jurisdiction fails. If at any time during proceedings on a case, the
court discovers that the conditions upon its jurisdiction have not been met, it must dismiss
the case. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
'" Federal courts do have a limited flexibility in applying jurisdictional prerequisites,
stemming from their power to determine their own jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v.
United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563
(1906). For example, in the case of time limits, courts have a certain flexibility in determining
when the time period began to run. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); Quinton
v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962). Although this flexibility strays close to equita-
ble power, a court is limited to determining whether there has been compliance and may not
openly excuse noncompliance on equitable grounds. But see text and note at note 12 supra.
2 Once a statute of limitations has run, the individual loses his ability to invoke "the
public power in support of an otherwise valid claim." Developments in the Law-Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HAv. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. How-
ever, noncompliance with a statute of limitations must be raised by the defendant as an
affirmative defense; failure to raise the defense constitutes a waiver. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)l.
As a result of the possibility of waiver, parties to an action may agree not to plead the
limitations period. Cf. United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (a statute of
limitations in a criminal statute may be waived by criminal defendant). This is in marked
contrast to the parties' inability to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a federal court by
consent. See note 21 supra. Moreover, even when the defendant raises the running of the
limitations period as a defense, the court has equitable power to excuse the plaintiff's untime-
liness. See text and notes at notes 24-26 infra.
2' A court may toll the time period where, for example, the defendant fraudulently
conceals his wrong from the plaintiff, or the wrong is of such a nature that it tends to conceal
itself. See, e.g., Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349-50 (1874).
2 A defendant is estopped from raising the running of the period when he induces the
plaintiff to forbear from filing suit until the period has run. See Developments, supra note
23, at 1222.
" See note 23 supra; Dawson, Estoppel and Statutes of Limitation, 34 MICH. L. Rxv. 1
(1935).
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limits characterized as jurisdictional prerequisites entail a single
question: was there compliance? Time limits characterized as stat-
utes of limitations entail a further question: does the explanation
for noncompliance justify the court's use of its equitable power to
maintain the suit?
One way to determine whether a time requirement such as that
in section 626(d)(1) should be characterized as jurisdictional or as
a statute of limitations is to appeal to principles of statutory con-
struction. One such principle has been traditionally employed to
distinguish two categories of statutes of limitations: "substantive"
statutes that are not subject to equitable modification, and
"procedural" statutes that are.27 This principle characterizes time
limits as substantive if they are contained in the same act that
created the right sought to be enforced, on the ground that such
limitations are conditions upon that right and therefore absolute.2
The running of a substantive time limit extinguishes the underlying
right. Procedural time limits, on the other hand, are held to affect
only the remedy and not the right.29 They are thus subject to the
traditional equitable doctrines of tolling, estoppel, and waiver."
This principle of statutory construction is based on a presumption
that the legislature meant noncompliance with time limits included
in the body of a statute to preclude judicial tolling of the time limit
or application of estoppel doctrine.
The Supreme Court, in Burnett v. New York Central
Railroad,31 repudiated this mechanical principle and held that
courts must determine whether Congress actually intended the time
limit to be absolute or to be subject to equitable principles. In order
to determine Congress's intent, the courts must examine the pur-
poses and policies underlying the limitations provisions, the statute
in which they appear, and the remedial scheme developed for en-
2 Developments, supra note 23, at 1186-88; 34 AM. Jun. Limitation of Actions § 187
(1941).
2, Developments, supra note 23, at 1188. Substantive statutes of limitations and jurisdic-
tional prerequisites appear to be functional equivalents, in that neither is subject to tolling
or estoppel. However, because a substantive time limit is a statute of limitations, it must be
raised as a defense and therefore may be waived. See id. at 1199. A substantive statute of
limitations cannot be said to go to the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts, as does a
jurisdictional prerequisite. See note 23 supra.
2 Developments, supra note 23, at 1186-87, 1234.
10 See notes 24-25 supra. A time period is waived when the defendant agrees, either
expressly or implicitly, not to raise the period as a defense. See note 23 supra. See also
Dawson, supra note 26, at 11 (suggesting that the better conceptualization of waiver is
"estoppel").
31 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
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forcing the statutory rights.2 "[T]he basic question . . . is one of
legislative intent whether the right shall be enforceable . . . after
the prescribed time." 3  The Court reiterated this position in
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,u citing with approval
an earlier case in which it had rejected the contention that when
"the time limitation is an integral part of a new cause of action...
that cause is irretrievably lost at the end of the stautory period." 35
Burnett and American Pipe addressed the authority of the
courts to toll time limitations that have already been characterized
as statutes of limitations. But the reasoning of these cases and their
rejection of any mechanical test also apply to the prior question
whether a given time limit is jurisdictional or analogous to a statute
of limitations. 38 If nothing short of the thorough analysis demanded
by Burnett and American Pipe is sufficient to establish the charac-
ter of a statute of limitations, no less demanding or more mechani-
cal approach should suffice for determining whether a time require-
ment is jurisdictional or not. Under the rationale of those cases, the
critical question for determining how to characterize section
u Id. at 427.
3 Id. at 426 (citations omitted).
414 U.S. 538 (1974).
Id. at 559, quoting Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232 (1959).
38 In at least one case arising under the ADEA, Skoglund v. Singer Co., 403 F. Supp.
797 (D.N.H. 1975), the court thought it necessary to rebut the argument that "where statu-
tory rights are asserted in a court, strict compliance with the statute in question is a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite to the commencement of a civil action based upon that statute." Id. at
801, quoting McGarvey v. Merck & Co., 359 F. Supp. 525, 528 (D.N.J. 1973), vacated, 493
F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 836 (1975); accord, Abshire v. Chicago & E.
Ill. R.R., 352 F. Supp. 601, 604-05 (N.D. Ill. 1972). This principle is traceable to Scott v.
Railroad Retirement Bd., 227 F.2d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 1955), which in turn relied upon Math-
eny v. Porter, 158 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1946). According to the Seventh Circuit in Scott, the
Tenth Circuit in Matheny had "pointed out the distinction between an ordinary statute of
limitation and a limitation found in the statute which created the right of action, and ex-
plained that, on the expiration of the time to sue fixed in the statute creating the right, the
right of action itself is extinguished." 227 F.2d at 686. This is the very principle that the
Supreme Court rejected in Burnett and American Pipe. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit in
Matheny explicitly derived its premises from the case of The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886),
which case the Supreme Court first in Burnett, then in American Pipe, explained was the
genesis of the unsound distinction between procedural and substantive statutes of limita-
tions. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 427 n.2 (1965); American Pipe & Constr.
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 556. (1974). This suggests that there is a historical connection
between the conflicting doctrines of statutory construction that faced the Supreme Court in
Burnett and American Pipe and the conflicting doctrines confronting courts construing the
requirements of the ADEA. The reasoning in Burnett and American Pipe is pertinent to the
problems surrounding the construction of the ADEA time requirements despite the fact that
these cases involved problems of characterizing time limits already assumed to be statutes
of limitations, while the problem presented by the ADEA is to determine whether its time
requirements are "jurisdictional" or analogous to statutes of limitations.
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626(d)(1) is what consequences Congress intended should follow
from noncompliance with its time limit, based on an analysis of the
scheme and purposes of the ADEA.
B. The Procedural Scheme of the ADEA and the Judicial
Approach
Section 626(d) of the ADEA provides in part that
No civil action may be commenced by any individual. . . until
the individual has given the Secretary not less than sixty days'
notice of an intent to file such action. Such notice shall be
filed-
(1) within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged
unlawful practice occurred. .... 31
A major purpose of this scheme is to provide the Secretary of Labor
with an opportunity to avert litigation by attempting an informal
settlement.38 The requirement that an individual who intends to sue
his employer for violations of the ADEA must notify the Secretary
is uniformly viewed as a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. 9 To con-
strue the notice requirement in any other manner would frustrate
the scheme's purpose by inducing plaintiffs to apply directly to the
courts for determination of the need to resort to informal proce-
dures.
The courts have also uniformly held that the requirement that
the Secretary have sixty days in which to attempt an informal reso-
lution of the dispute is jurisdictional." In effect, the courts view
these two elements of the scheme as a single jurisdictional prere-
quisite to suit.41 However, the problem remains whether the third
element of the scheme, the 180-day time limit, is separable from the
jurisdictional requirement of sixty days' notice and therefore ana-
lyzable independently in the manner suggested by Burnett and
American Pipe.
v 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970).
m H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., lst Sess. (1967), reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2213, 2218; Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617, 621 (D. Kan. 1973).
1, Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1097
(1977); Hiscott v. General Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975); Edwards v. Kaiser Alum.
& Chem. Sales, Inc., 515 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1975); Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494
F. 2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974); Raynor v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 400 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Va.
1975); Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 382 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Oshiro v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 80 (D. Hawaii 1974); Gebhard v GAF Corp., 59 F.R.D.
504 (D.D.C. 1973); Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973); Cochran v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 376 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. La. 1971).
40 See note 39 supra.
" See note 39 supra.
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Most courts that have considered the requirement that the Sec-
retary be notified within 180 days after the alleged discrimination
occurred have concluded that compliance with this time limit is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.4 2 These courts characteristically
treat the requirement as an inseparable aspect of the notice require-
ment, basing their conclusion on the legislative history of the
ADEA, analogies to Title VII precedent, and a functional analysis
of the Act. However, a recent case has examined the same sources
and treated the requirement as independent of the notice prerequis-
ite.43
1. The Legislative History. The ADEA's legislative history
has proven unsatisfactory as a guide for interpreting section
626(d)(1). The 180-day time limit was part of the original Senate
bill,44 then was deleted by the House of Representatives" and finally
was restored as one of several amendments to the bill as enacted."
Although few congressional statements mark this process, some
courts have attempted to infer a clear legislative intent.
In Powell v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 47 the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected a contention that the legislative history of section
626(d) supported the proposition that the 180-day limit was "merely
directory" rather than "jurisdictional in nature."48 Noting that
nothing in the legislative history "addresses the precise question," 9
the court found "some support for, if anything," construing the 180-
day time limit as jurisdictional.50 Focusing on House Report No.
805,11 which discussed the "companion requirement" of the sixty-
day waiting period after a notice of intent to sue had been filed, the
12 See Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1975); Hiscott v. General Elec.
Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975); Edwards v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Sales, Inc., 515 F.2d
1195 (5th Cir. 1975); Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974);
Raynor v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 400 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Va. 1975); Vaughn v. Chrysler
Corp., 382 F. Supp 143 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Oshiro v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 378 F.
Supp. 80 (D. Hawaii 1974); Gebhard v. GAF Corp., 59 F.R.D. 504 (D.D.C. 1973); Burgett v.
Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973); Cochran v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 376
F. Supp. 302 (E.D. La. 1971).
0 Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1097
(1977).
" S. 830, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2213, 2218.
- H.R. 13054, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); 113 CoNG. REc. 34,738 (1967).
11 The House concurred in the amendment. 114 CONG. REc. 35,133 (1967).
47 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 488.
" Id.
"Id.
H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in [1967] U.S. CONG. &
AD. NEws 2213, 2218; Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617, 621 (D. Kan. 1973).
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court noted that Congress had "characterized the notice as a
'condition precedent' to filing."' 2 Without further analysis, the court
found that a "permissible inference is that the requirement of time-
liness attending notice is likewise a condition precedent to suit.
53
The basis of this inference is unclear. The 180-day limit, which
was absent from the House version of the bill,54 was not mentioned
in the House report that the Fifth Circuit examined.5 The court did
note that the same House report had stated that "persons intending
to file [suit] must give the Secretary . . .60 days' notice... '"
and "[m]ore to the point," the Senate report on the bill" had used
the same mandatory language with regard to the 180-day time
limit. One appearance of such mandatory language in a congres-
sional report is an insufficient basis for interpreting an ambiguous
statute. 9 The court sought further support for characterizing the
time limit as jurisdictional in a statement by Senator Javits, a
proponent of the Senate amendments, to the effect that the limit
was restored "together with several other portions of the original
Senate bill," in order "to answer some of the disquiet in American
business ....*"60 The court infers from these remarks that only a
180-day jurisdictional prerequisite to suit would calm the "disquiet
in . . . business"; characterizing the time limit as a statute of
limitations would not suffice. The record does not disclose the
52 494 F.2d at 488.
53 Id.
" H.R. 13054, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. Rac. 34,738 (1967).
m H.R. REp. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in [1967] U.S. CONG. &
AD. NEws 2213, 2218; Burgett v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617, 621 (D. Kan. 1973).
' 494 F.2d at 488, quoting H.R. REp. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
" S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
m 494 F.2d at 488.
5' Caution is required in drawing inferences as to the mandatory or directory character
of a statutory provision on the basis of language actually contained in the statute.
[Ilt is important to keep in mind the sense in which the terms mandatory
[jurisdictional] and directory [nonjurisdictional, e.g., statutes of limitations] are used,
that they are only descriptive of the effect that it has been decided should be given to a
statutory provision, and that there is no essential difference in statutes whereby their
mandatory or directory character can be identified as a means to determining their
effect. No statutory provisions are intended by the legislature to be disregarded; but
where the consequences of not obeying them in every particular are not prescribed, the
courts must judicially determine them.
J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 57.01 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973).
Even more caution is necessary where the imperative language is found not in the language
of the statute, but only in the legislative history. Interestingly, § 626(d) does not use the word
"must," but rather the word "shall." If anything, "shall" is less imperative than "must"; in
either case, the terminology is not dispositive where there are other factors to consider. Id.
ch. 57.
" 494 F.2d at 488, citing 113 CONG. REc. 35,056 (1967) (remarks of Senator Javits).
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precise nature of the concerns of the business sector, and the general
nature of Senator Javits's remarks makes them poor support for the
court's interpretation. Conceivably, the business sector would have
been or was satisfied with the addition of a statute of limitations
where none had previously existed.
The analysis in Powell demonstrates the limitations of search-
ing the sparse legislative history for evidence of congressional intent.
Furthermore, Powell rests on the assumption, never explained, that
the admittedly jurisdictional notice and sixty-day waiting period
requirements are "companion" to the 180-day time limit."
In Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 2 the Tenth Circuit rejected this as-
sumption and examined the legislative history for indications that
the 180-day period, apart from the notice of intent to sue require-
ment, was jurisdictional. The court found nothing to convince it
"that Congress intended the failure to file notice within the one
hundred and eighty day notice period to be an absolute bar to bring-
ing an ADEA private action. '8 3 The Dartt Court's more specific
investigation is more in line with the thorough analysis that Burnett
and American Pipe suggest is necessary to characterize properly a
procedural time requirement, and the court's findings demonstrate
that the legislative history simply provides no reliable guide.
2. Title VII Precedent. The courts faced with the problem of
construing the ADEA have looked to Title VII precedent for guid-
ance. Although the statutes are historically linked64 and share many
similar provisions, 5 the examination of Title VII precedent, like the
legislative history of the ADEA, has provided little assistance. The
Tenth Circuit in Dartt partially based its conclusion that the 180-
day time limit is not jurisdictional on three Title VII cases." In
61 Id.
12 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1097 (1977).
" Id. at 1259.
6, Under § 715 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1970), the Secretary of Labor was
required to undertake a study of age discrimination in employment and to supply Congress
with specific legislative recommendations. The Secretary's report, The Older American
Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment, H.R. REP. No. 3708, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), and his legislative recommendations formed the basis of the ADEA.
15 Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 630 (1970) (ADEA substantive provisions) with 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2, 2000e (1970); compare 29 U.S.C. §§211(b), 216(c), 217, 626(b), 633 (1970) (ADEA
enforcement provisions) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970). For arguments that Title VII preced-
ent should not be automatically applied to ADEA cases, see Note, The Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 380 (1976).
11 539 F.2d at 1259-60, citing Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924
(5th Cir. 1975); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970); Antonopulos
v. Aerojet-General Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1390 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
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Cochran v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co.,67 the district court cited
three different Title VII cases to support the opposite result. 8 The
Fifth Circuit in Powell denied that the requirements of the ADEA
can be profitably compared with those of Title VII. These conflict-
ing uses of Title VII precedent reflect both structural differences
between the ADEA and Title VII and the unsettled state of Title
VII interpretation.
The enforcement mechanisms of the ADEA, while similar to
those of Title VII, are less complex, 7 reflecting a congressional de-
sire to avoid some of the administrative logjams experienced under
Title VI. 71 Neither act permits complainants to have direct access
to the courts; aggrieved individuals must file initial complaints with
an agency of the federal government.72 Under Title VII, the com-
plaint must be filed within 180 days after the alleged violation.7 3 In
language nearly identical to that of section 633(b) of the ADEA,74
section 2000e-5(c) of Title VIE75 provides that no charge may be filed
with the EEOC before the expiration of sixty days from the com-
mencement of state or local proceedings, unless those proceedings
11 376 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. La. 1971).
19 Id. at 303 n.6, citing Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011
(5th Cir. 1971); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969); Choate v. Caterpil-
lar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1969).
" The court reasoned that the time limit on filing a charge under Title VII was open to
judicial interpretation because it is not contained in the section of the Act which limited the
filing of civil actions. But the 180-day period of the ADEA is not open to interpretation
because it is contained in the section that expressly deals with time limits on civil actions.
The court concluded that it was "abundantly clear" that the ADEA requirement is jurisdic-
tional. 494 F.2d at 488.
10 For general discussions of procedure under Title VII, see Comment, Jurisdictional
Prerequisites to Private Actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 41 Mo. L.
REv. 215 (1976); Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109 (1971).
11 See 113 CONG. REc. 7076 (1976) (testimony of Sen. Javits before the Subcommittee on
Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare).
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970); 29 U.S.C § 626 (1970).
7' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. 11I 1973) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970) (90-
day period)).
71 See note 10 supra.
15 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. I 1973) provides:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or
political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful
employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority
to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect
thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (b) of this
section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have
been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier
terminated, provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and
twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such State or local law. ...
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have terminated earlier. However, it is less complicated for an indi-
vidual to bring his case to court after the initial filing of his com-
plaint under the ADEA than it is under Title VII. Under the ADEA,
the aggrieved individual may bring suit when the sixty-day notice
of intent to sue period has expired. Under Title VII the individual
may not file suit until the EEOC notifies him that it has dismissed
his complaint or has been unable to conciliate the dispute." After
the EEOC has had the complaint for 180 days, the complainant may
demand notice of his right to sue, 77 and must bring suit within
ninety days after receiving this notice.7 8
Even if the differences between the two Acts are ignored, Title
VII precedent is of limited assistance. The Supreme Court, in ap-
parently casual dicta, has characterized the Title VII requirements
of timely filing with the EEOC and receipt of notice of right to sue
as "jurisdictional prerequisites to a federal action" under the Act.71
The initial filing of a complaint with an appropriate state agency
has also been characterized as a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title
VII suit.8 0 However, these characterizations have not led to consis-
tent decisions under Title VII. For example, in Reeb v. Economic
Opportunity Atlanta, Inc."1 the Fifth Circuit held that the Title VII
time limitations are not "inflexible 'jurisdictional' absolutes" but
are subject to the equitable power of the courts.82 In Reeb, the court
reasoned that the 180-day filing requirement did not begin to run
until the plaintiff knew or should have known of her cause of action.
Other courts have held that the filing period may be tolled while the
aggrieved individual pursues remedies under a collective bargaining
agreement.8 These inconsistent readings of Title VII's time periods
76 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. HI 1973).
77 The regulations of the EEOC have construed the provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)
(Supp. 1I 1973) to require that after 180 days a notice of right to sue be issued upon the
demand of the complainant. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25b(c) (1975). Before the 1972 amendments to
Title VII, there was no provision for individual suit before the termination of EEOC proceed-
ings. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
Is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f)(1) (Supp. M 1973). Cf. 29 U.S.C. §§ 625(e), 255 (1970) (ADEA
statute of limitations).
7' McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973) (dictum). See also Olson
v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975); Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d
811 (7th Cir. 1972); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F. 2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968).
10 EEOC v. Union Bank, 408 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1968); Electrical Workers Local No. 5 v.
EEOC, 398 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969).
S, 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975).
', Id. at 929.
See Sanchez v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 499 F.2d 1107 (10th Cir. 1974); Culpepper
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); see Comment, Limitations Periods for Filing a Charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 56
B.U. L. REv. 70 (1976).
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and the differences in the ADEA's procedure and design support the
Powell court's refusal to rest its analysis of the ADEA on the Title
VII cases.
3. The Design and Purposes of the ADEA. The sparse legisla-
tive history and the indeteminate status of analogous procedural
requirements under Title VII require an examination of the design
and purposes of the ADEA, as suggested by the analysis in Burnett
and American Pipe,84 in order to characterize the 180-day time
limit. Some of the courts that term the time limit jurisdictional
have undertaken this analysis. However, by treating the 180-day
period as inseparable from the notice requirement, these cases have
failed to consider the possibility that the 180-day period was in-
tended to serve a different purpose than the notice requirement.
In Burgett v. Cudahy Co.,8 the district court focused on the
ADEA's emphasis on "private settlement and the elimination of age
discrimination without formal litigation.""7 The Secretary of
Labor's initial exclusive jurisdiction over ADEA disputes, the court
reasoned, is essential to the Act's goal of furthering private settle-
ment and conciliation. The Secretary can "meaningfully exercise
his conciliatory authority" only if he is "provided with notice of a
violation and a reasonable length of time within which to seek elimi-
nation of the discriminatory practices."" Therefore, "the filing of a
notice of intent to sue within one hundred and eighty days after a
discriminatory act occurs and sixty days prior to the institution of
an action, is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the maintenance of an
action under the Act."89 By viewing the sixty-day and the 180-day
time limits as a single requirement designed to effectuate the grant
of initial jurisdiction to the Secretary of Labor, the Burgett court
never applied the Burnett and American Pipe analysis indepen-
dently to the 180-day requirement. Even if the court is correct in
arguing that the overall purpose and scheme of the ADEA can be
effectuated only if the notice requirement is jurisdictional, no ex-
planation is offered as to why the 180-day filing period is inseparable
from the notice and sixty-day waiting period, or why it must also
be jurisdictional. Indeed, the Burgett approach suggests that inter-
preting the sixty-day notice requirement as jurisdictional may be
" See text and notes at notes 31-35 supra.
See, e.g., Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974); Burgett
v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973).
U 361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973).
" Id. at 621.
"Id.
'1 Id. at 621-22.
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sufficient to allow the Secretary an opportunity to reconcile the
dispute through conciliation before private suit.
In Dartt v. Shell Oil Co.,"0 the Tenth Circuit focused on the role
that the 180-day time limit plays apart from, or in addition to, the
grant of initial jurisdiction to the Secretary of Labor. The court
concluded that, while the notice of intent to sue is an absolute
requirement,"' the time limit for filing the notice is subject to equi-
table modification.9 2 Looking to section 626(d)(1), the court found
that
the two basic purposes behind the 180-day requirement are: (1)
To provide the Labor Department with an opportunity to
achieve a conciliation of the complaint while the complaint is
still fresh, and (2) to give early notice to the employer of a
possible lawsuit, the latter promoting both the preservation of
evidence and good faith negotiating on the part of the employer
during the conciliation period. 3
The court determined that the plaintiffs actions had satisfied
these purposes. 4 The plaintiff had filed a complaint with the De-
kartment of Labor soon after her discharge, the Department had
notified the employer of the allegations, and conciliation negotia-
tions were begun. The plaintiff's failure to meet the filing deadline
was the fault of the Department of Labor officials, who had not
advised her of the requirement when she made her complaint, and
of her employer, who had delayed giving the Department necessary
information. In addition, the general notice of the ADEA provisions
that had been supplied by the Department and posted by her em-
ployer was insufficient to inform her of the time limit. 5
90 539 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1976).
11 Id. at 1260.
92 Id. at 1259-61. The court rejected the plaintiff's alternative argument that a complaint
to the Department of Labor that did not state an intent to sue was adequate to satisfy the
notice requirement. Id. But see Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga.
1973).
539 F.2d at 1261.
' The court found that Dartt had been discharged on July 31, 1973, that she had filed a
complaint with the Department of Labor shortly thereafter (August 9, 1973), and that a
Department official was able to, and did, contact defendant Shell Oil on the same day the
complaint was filed. Id. at 1258.
9 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1970) provides:
Every employer, employment agency, and labor organization shall post and keep
posted in conspicuous places upon its premises a notice to be prepared or approved by
the Secretary setting forth information as the Secretary deems appropriate to effectuate
the purposes of this chapter.
Although Shell had posted the notice which the Secretary provided, the court found this
notice to be "completely inadequate to inform Dartt as to the 180-day notice requirement."
539 F.2d at 1262.
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Since the plaintiffs delay was due to the fault of others and
since the purpose of the requirement had been met, the court held
that the time limit was tolled until the notice of intent to sue was
filed." The court buttressed its analysis by looking to the general
purposes of the ADEA. Noting that the Act was "remedial and
humanitarian legislation," the court reasoned that the procedural
requirements must be liberally interpreted in order to "effectuate
the congressional purpose of ending age discrimination."97 Judicial
insistence on strict compliance with all the procedural requirements
could frustrate this purpose since the substantive right conferred by
the Act is often enforced by laymen.18 By examining the 180-day
time limit in light of its role within the ADEA's procedural scheme
and the broad purposes the Act is designed to serve, the Dartt court
applied the analysis contemplated by Burnett and American Pipe.
The validity of the Dartt result can be tested by examining the
effects of characterizing the 180-day time limit as jurisdictional or
as nonjurisdictional. The Dartt court followed the judicial consen-
sus99 that the notice of intent to sue and the sixty-day waiting period
are a single jurisdictional prerequisite. The purpose of vesting juris-
diction in the Secretary of Labor is to insure that age-based employ-
ment disputes will be settled informally whenever possible. The
sixty-day time limit on the Secretary's exclusive jurisdiction pro-
vides an opportunity to attempt a conciliation without unduly de-
laying the complainant's access to the courts. While the goal of
conciliation could be served regardless of when the Secretary learns
of an aggrieved individual's intent to file suit, the 180-day time
period makes the Secretary's intervention more effective. He re-
ceives prompt notice of alleged violations and can begin his investi-
gation while the memories of the parties to the dispute are fresh,
and evidence of the alleged discrimination, such as employment
" 539 F.2d at 1262.
,7 Id. at 1260. The ADEA's remedial character and the need to construe its provisions
liberally have been accepted by other cases as well. See Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525
F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975); Budreck v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 407 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Skoglund v. Singer Co., 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975); Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp.,
369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
" 539 F.2d at 1260. A similar rationale for liberal construction was advanced in Skoglund
v. Singer Co., 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975), and in Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369
F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973). This line of reasoning was suggested by the Title VII cases,
including Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972), and Reeb v. Economic Opportunity
Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975).
" See notes 39, 91 supra. But see Eklund v. Lubrizol Corp., 529 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1976)
(McCree, J., dissenting); Rucker v. Great Scott Supermarkets, 528 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1976)
(McCree, J., concurring) (suggesting that none of the requirements of § 626(d) are jurisdic-
tional).
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interview records, is still available. Early notice that the aggrieved
individual intends to sue also guards against unfairness to employ-
ers and relieves them of the burden of defending stale claims.
Construing the period as a jurisdictional prerequisite clearly
serves the purposes of preventing stale claims, preserving necessary
evidence, and enhancing the Secretary's effectiveness in achieving
informal conciliations. However, if the period is held to be outside
the court's power to toll, waive, or estop, discriminatees may lose
their ability to enforce their rights under the Act not because of their
own delay, but due to the employer's fraud or negligence, or to the
negligence of the Department of Labor.10 Section 627 of the ADEA
attempts to aid victims of discrimination by requiring employers to
post a notice provided or approved by the Department of Labor
informing employees of their rights under the Act and the proce-
dures for enforcing these rights."' Although this provision partially
' Statutes of limitations can be said primarily to promote fairness to defendants, and
secondarily to promote judicial effectiveness by relieving the courts of the burden of adjudi-
cating stale claims. See Developments, supra note 23, at 1185. The ability of the courts to
modify these time periods assures that they will not be used to block suits where the defen-
dant has been the cause of the untimeliness or where the nature of the wrong was such that
the plaintiff could not have learned of it until after the period had run. Jurisdictional time
limits may also have the effect of protecting defendants and relieving the burden on the
courts, but these are not the primary purposes. The inflexibility of jurisdictional prerequisites
makes them ill-suited to further policies that may depend on the equities of a particular case.
The major value of jurisdictional requirements is that they enable Congress to allocate the
power to decide cases among various forums, thereby molding the power of the federal govern-
ment for the best effectuation of congressional policies. For example, Congress may use such
statutory requirements initially to channel controversies away from the courts to governmen-
tal bodies that it believes can resolve the conflict more satisfactorily. This appears to have
been the case with the congressional grant of initial jurisdiction over labor disputes to the
NLRB under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 150-170, 160(a),(d) (1970).
Jurisdictional prerequisites should not function to preclude access to all forums in the event
of noncompliance save for exceptional and limited areas of the law. One such exceptional area
may involve the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401 (1970),
pursuant to which courts have held that a plaintiff's strict compliance with the procedural
requirements of the Act are a prerequisite to judicial acquisition of power to hear suits against
the sovereign that would otherwise be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See, e.g.,
Simon v. United States, 244 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1957); Rauch v. Davis, 8 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir.
1925). Waivers of sovereign immunity have traditonally been narrowly construed. United
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1941); Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States, 272
U.S. 675, 686 (1927). In cases where no such special consideration is present, it may be
unreasonable to assume that Congress would seek to mold the jurisdiction of the courts in
such a way that conscientious plaintiffs would be unable to enforce rights granted by Congress
pursuant to a congressional policy, e.g., the elimination of age discrimination in employment,
that can be enforced in no other forum. Courts should approach the problem of construing
procedural requirements with the presumption that, where these requirements do not vest
jurisdiction in another governmental body, Congress did not intend them to limit the subject
matter jurisdiction of the courts.
0I The text of § 627 is provided at note 95 supra.
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meets the problem noted by the court in Dartt that the primary
burden of enforcing ADEA rights rests on laymen, cases arising
under the ADEA demonstrate that it is insufficient to safeguard an
individual's opportunity to enforce his rights.12 If an employer de-
liberately or negligently fails to post the section 627 notice, his em-
ployees may be unaware that they have a remedy for age-based
discrimination until after the 180-day period has expired.' Even if
this notice provision is met, an employer may lead his employee to
believe incorrectly that he or she has not been the subject of special,
age-based treatment, and the employee may not discover the true
state of affairs for more than 180 days. 04 An employer could also
induce his employee to delay in filing a notice of intent to sue by
falsely promising compensation for the employee's loss.'Further-
more, as the Dartt case illustrates, negligent mishandling of com-
plaints by the Department of Labor may cause an individual to fail
to provide notice of intent to sue within the 180-day period. If an
individual takes his grievance to the Department and is not advised
of the necessary procedural steps to bring his case to court, he may
miss timely filing of his formal notice of intent to sue. Even if the
individual knows the Act's requirements through a section 627 no-
tice posted by his employer, a Labor Department official may lead
him to believe that his complaint, even if oral and without a specific
mention of his intent to sue, has met the requirements of the Act. 00
If the courts are without power to toll or waive the 180-day period
in such circumstances, discriminators could easily avoid any sanc-
tions under the Act.
When a plaintiff has failed to meet the time limit through the
fault of others, the courts have usually avoided the harsh results
that should logically follow the characterization of the 180-day re-
quirement as jurisdictional. While terming the time limit jurisdic-
tional, the courts have weighed the plaintiff's interest in attempting
to vindicate his rights under the Act against the defendant's burden
in litigating an untimely suit, thus treating the time limit as analo-
gous to a statute of limitations. 7 This approach has resulted in
I" See, e.g., Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S.
Ct. 1097 (1977).
I See Edwards v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc., 515 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1975)
(dictum). But see Hiscott v. General Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632, 634 (6th Cir. 1975); Brohl v.
Singer Co., 407 F. Supp. 936 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
'"See McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
' See Hiscott v. General Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975).
'"See Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
See id. (holding substantial compliance with the notice requirement sufficient where
Department of Labor negligently failed to inform plaintiff of the requirement that she file
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conceptual confusion, disharmony among the courts, and unpre-
dictable law. Frankly acknowledging that the 180-day period is to
be treated as a statute of limitations would alleviate this confusion.
Furthermore, the purposive analysis suggested by the Supreme
Court in Burnett and American Pipe supports this interpretation of
the time limit. The ability of conscientious plaintiffs to enforce their
rights should not turn on the ability of the courts to manipulate the
jurisdictional period. Rather, the courts should be able to resolve
problems of untimeliness in light of traditional equitable princi-
ples. 0 8 Construing the 180-day time period as a statute of limita-
tions would maintain its role of precluding stale claims and preserv-
ing fresh evidence without allowing alleged discriminators to escape
sanction under the Act. The improved effectiveness of the Act's
enforcement mechanism, as well as the increased consistency and
predictability of ADEA cases, strongly support the Dartt court's
conclusion that Congress did not intend the 180-day requirement to
be jurisdictional.
written notice of her intent to file suit); Edwards v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc.,
515 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1975) (dictum suggesting that 180-day period may be tolled where
employer has failed to post notice of ADEA required by 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1970)); Bishop v.
Jelleff Assocs., Inc., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974) (holding oral complaint to Department
of Labor sufficient to maintain action where employer failed to post notice required by 29
U.S.C. § 627 (1970)). But see Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.
1974).
,0 Equitable principles such as estoppel and tolling will not answer all the questions that
may arise in applying the 180-day requirement. Two situations may cause particular diffi-
culty. Where the plaintiff's tardiness is due to the mishandling of his complaint by the
Department of Labor, see, e.g., Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 1097 (1977), a court must balance the plaintiff's interest in obtaining a
remedy against the interests of the employer that the requirement is designed to protect.
Where an employer has posted a § 627 notice and has not attempted to interfere with his
employee's recourse under the Act, it may be unfair to deprive him of the protection of the
180-day period because of the negligence of the Department of Labor. This problem did not
appear in Dartt because the employer had contributed to the Department's mishandling of
the complaint and had posted an inadequate notice.
A second problem arises where the plaintiff has pursued collective bargaining grievance
procedures for more than 180 days. This problem has been a source of conflict under Title
VII. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the Supreme Court held that
where an aggrieved individual has initially prusued his collective bargaining grievance proce-
dures, he is not barred from filing an action under the Title. The circuits have split over
whether Gardner-Denver means that Title VII time limits will be tolled during pursuit of
collective bargaining grievance procedures. See Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc, 525 F.2d 124
(6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1723 (1976) (holding that filing of a grievance does
not toll the running of the EEOC filing limitation period); contra, Sanchez v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 499 F.2d 1107 (10th Cir. 1974); Note, Jurisdictional Prerequisites to Private
Actions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 41 Mo. L. Rxv. 215, 222-25 (1976).
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I1. SECTION 633
Section 6339 of the ADEA regulates the impact of the federal
law of age discrimination in employment on similar state and local
laws. The section gives state officials a sixty-day period in which to
attempt to resolve an age-based employment dispute before they are
preempted by a federal suit. Some courts have held that the provi-
sion requires individuals in states with age discrimination laws to
file a complaint with the appropriate state agency,"' raising the
question whether this requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
suit or subject to waiver.' Other courts have concluded that the
section is designed to give state officials a sixty-day period in which
to act before federal suit can be brought only if the aggrieved indi-
vidual has chosen to bring his complaint to the state as well as to
the Department of Labor."2 This interpretation creates a question
concerning the construction of section 626(d) (2), which modifies the
180-day time limit by requiring plaintiffs in cases "to which section
633(b) . . . applies" to file notice with the Secretary within 300 days
of the alleged violation or within thrity days of the termination of
state proceedings, whichever is earlier.13 The courts must decide
whether an individual who resides in a state with age discrimination
laws may receive the benefit of the expanded filing period even if
he has not filed a state complaint.
Title VII is more significant for the interpretation of section 633
of the ADEA than for the interpretation of section 626. The Title
VII federalism provision, section 2000e-5(c),"4 has been construed to
IN The text of § 633 is provided at note 10 supra.
11 E.g., Eklund v. Lubrizol Corp., 529 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1976); Curry v. Continental
Airlines, 513 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1975); Goger v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974);
Smith v. Crest Communities, Inc., 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7334 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
"I See Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123, 1125 (N.D. Ill. 1976)
(dictum); Smith v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 419 F.Supp. 770 (D.N.J. 1976); Skoglund v.
Singer Co., 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975).
112 Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (dictum);
Vazquez v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353 (D.P.R. 1975); Goger v. H.K. Porter Co.,
492 F.2d 13, 17 (3d Cir. 1974) (Garth, J., concurring).
"1 The text of § 626(d)(2) is provided at note 9 supra.
"1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. m1 1973) provides:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political
subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employ-
ment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant
or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto
upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (b) of this section
by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been
commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier
terminated ....
This section was denominated § 2000e-5(b) before the 1972 amendments to Title VII. See also
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require individuals to file complaints with appropriate state author-
ities before seeking federal relief,"5 an interpretation strongly sup-
ported by the legislative history."6 Several of the courts that have
considered the ADEA federalism provision have found its similarity
to Title VII indicative of a congressional intent that it have an
identical meaning." 7 The Third Circuit, in Goger v. H.K. Porter
Co.," 8 buttressed the argument from the similar language of the two
provisions by reference to the legislative history of the ADEA."5
Other courts have found the ADEA provision distinguishable
from the Title VII provision and thus open to different interpreta-
tion. 2 0 The courts in Vazquez v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.'2' and
Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co2 2 advanced three grounds for
distinguishing between the ADEA provision and its Title VII coun-
terpart: the ADEA provision must be construed in the context of its
distinctly different procedural scheme;2 3 the isolation of the ADEA
federalism provision from the procedural requirements of the Act is
probative evidence that Congress did not intend to make filing with
the state a condition to federal suit under the ADEA; 2 4 and the
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(d) (Supp. mI 1973), which governs deferral when the EEOC itself initiates
proceedings.
"I Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972); Crosslin v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 422 F.2d 1028, vacated, 400 U.S. 1004 (1971); EEOC v. Union Bank, 408 F.2d 867 (9th
Cir. 1968); Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267(4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 910 (1968); Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
"'See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 12,721 (1964). Senator Humphrey remarked: "If the practice
complained of occurs in a State or locality which has a law prohibiting such practices and
establishing an agency to deal with them . . , the individual complainant cannot file his
charge with the Commission until the State or local agency has been given an opportunity to
handle the problem under State or local law. However, after the agency has had 60 days to
adjust the complaint, or after it terminates proceedings on it, the complainant may go to the
Federal Commission." Id.
117 Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1975); Goger v. H.K. Porter Co.
492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974); McGarvey v. Merck & Co., 359 F. Supp. 525 (D.N.J. 1973),
vacated, 493 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
Is 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974).
"I During the course of hearings on the ADEA, Congress was advised to adopt the
federalism arrangements of Title VII. Goger v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13, 16 n.13 (3d Cir.
1974) (citing statements by Andrew J. Biemiller, Legislative Director of the AFL-CIO, and
J. Edward Conway, New York State Commission for Human Rights).
11* Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (dictum);
Vazquez v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353 (D.P.R. 1975); Goger v. H.K. Porter Co.,
492 F.2d 13, 17 (3d Cir. 1974) (Garth, J., concurring).
121 405 F. Supp. 1353 (D.P.R. 1975).
22 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
'2 Id. at 1126-27; Vazquez v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353, 1354-55 (D.P.R.
1975).
124 Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123, 1126-27 (N.D. Ill. 1976);
Vazquez v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (D.P.R. 1975).
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addition of subsection 633(a) significantly alters the meaning of the
language borrowed from Title VII and embodied in subsection
633(b) of the ADEA.'25
In Vazquez the court looked to Congress's rejection of the Title
VII procedural scheme for the ADEA and concluded that to follow
the Title VII precedents and construe the ADEA federalism provi-
sion as requiring state filing would "create a procedural pitfall for
unsuspecting individuals which could easily serve . . . to deprive
aggrieved individuals of their day in court .... ,,,21 However, con-
gressional dissatisfaction with the procedure of Title VII, in part
based on the delays it had engendered,127 does not necessarily dem-
onstrate dissatisfaction with the Title VII federalism provisions.
The Third Circuit in Goger v. H.K. Porter Co.'12 argued that the
legislative history of the ADEA and the adoption of Title VII lan-
guage in section 633 support an inference of congressional satisfac-
tion with the Title VII federalism provision.'12 The desire to avoid
trespassing into areas of legitimate state concern where the states
have acted or are encouraged to act may, as under Title VII, out-
weigh Congress's concern to design the enforcement provision of the
Act to operate as efficiently as possible.
The other arguments advanced by Bertrand and Vazquez focus
on differences between the Title VII provision and section 633. The
first of these arguments, that substantial weight should be attached
to the section's location within the ADEA,3 0 fails to dispose of the
presumption of similar meaning raised by the similar language.
That Congress sought to make a fundamental change in meaning
simply by shifting the location of the provision is highly doubtful.
It may be significant that, while the Title VII federalism provision
is contained among the procedural requirements of that Act, the
ADEA provision stands apart. However, the significance of a change
in the location of the provision is uncertain unless its language
indicates that Congress intentionally "relocated" it because it was
no longer appropriate to place it among the procedural requirements
of the ADEA.
12 Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Vaz-
quez v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (D.P.R. 1975).
' 405 F. Supp. at 1357.
' Id. at 1355.
' 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974).
121 429 F.2d at 16. This inference is buttressed by the fact that when Title VII was
amended in 1972, Congress retained the original state-federal provision. Compare 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b) (1970) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. 11 1973).
'0 Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123, 1126-27 (N.D. 111. 1976).
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The strongest distinction from Title VII is the addition of
subsection 633(a) to the body of the Title VII "model"-a highly
significant change in the language of the provision. This subsection
provides that
[n]othing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of any
agency of any State performing like functions with regard to
discriminatory employment practices on account of age except
that upon commencement of action under this chapter such
action shall supersede any State action. 13'
Judge Garth, concurring in Goger v. H.K. Porter Co., 132 found it
unbelievable that Congress intended to require as a precondition to
federal suit "the commencement of a State proceeding which, under
§ 633(b), need not be concluded and which in any event would be
superseded by the filing of a Federal action under § 633(a)."' 33 Part
of this argument would apply to the Title VII federalism procedure
as well, since that section appears to require only that state proceed-
ings be initiated, not completed; but Title VII contains no provision
analogous to section 633(a) that would require a stay of state pro-
ceedings on commencement of a federal action.' 34
Furthermore, section 633 differs from Title VII in an aspect the
courts have ignored. Section 2000e-5(c) of Title VII places a morato-
rium on all initiation of federal action by individuals for sixty days
after state proceedings have begun by prohibiting individuals from
filing a charge with the EEOC before the end of that time. During
the two-month period state officials can seek resolution under state
law with exclusive power to negotiate with the alleged discrimina-
tor, to examine his records, and to compile evidence. 131 Under sec-
tion 633 of the ADEA, on the other hand, the aggrieved individual
is simply prohibited from filing suit during the sixty-day period.
Apparently, an individual could file state charges and notify the
29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1970).
' '. 492 F.2d 13, 17 (3d Cir. 1974) (Garth, J., concurring).
11 Id. at 18.
"I While the Title VII requirement has been characterized as an "exhaustion" require-
ment, EEOC v. Union Bank, 408 F.2d 867, 869-70 (9th Cir. 1968), it seems to mean no more
than that state proceedings must be begun.
See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1212 (1971) ("There is, however, no requirement
that state remedies be exhausted. State proceedings need only be commenced; at any time
after sixty days, the complainant may file charges with the EEOC, whether or not the state
agency has completed its action on the case. The state and federal authorities then proceed
side by side.").
' States also have the power to delay actions initiated by the EEOC itself for sixty days
while a state proceeding is in progress. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (Supp 1I 1973).
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Secretary of Labor of the violation on the same day and file his
federal suit sixty days later.'36 This would mean that the Depart-
ment of Labor would begin and conduct its investigation contem-
poraneously with state authorities. Thus, in contrast to Title VII,
the ADEA does not give exclusive jurisdiction to state agencies for
the sixty-day period.
In light of these distinguishing characteristies of the ADEA
provisions, to interpret section 633 to require individuals to file state
complaints reads a burdensome formality into the Act. Mandatory
state filing would force aggrieved individuals to file a state com-
plaint concurrently with their federal complaint, even when they
had no interest in obtaining a state remedy. Once the individual
complies with the requirement by filing a state complaint, he may
have little incentive to cooperate with state officials, particularly if
the state remedy is less attractive than federal remedies. State offi-
cials would also have little incentive to act on such pro forma com-
plaints. If state officials did act on a complaint concurrently with
the federal authorities, defendants and witnesses would be bur-
dened by the demands of two separate investigations. In addition,
the defendant's incentive to cooperate with state officials would be
hampered by subsection 633(a)'s provision that any state action will
be superseded by a federal action.
Interpreting section 633 to require state filing would not
strengthen state age discrimination laws or facilitate the efforts of
the state agencies charged with their implementation. Rather, such
a requirement would frustrate state efforts by burdening state offi-
cials with insincere complaints and investigations that might be
ultimately superflous if superseded by federal intervention.
The construction adopted by Judge Garth's concurrence and
the court in Vazquez, leaving to aggrieved individuals the choice
whether to pursue state remedies, is more satisfactory. Reading the
provision as elective may encourage states to develop age discrimi-
nation laws that are equal or superior to the federal law as an incen-
tive for its citizens to choose to file state complaints.'37 The provision
would then give substance to their election by giving state officials
"' Contra, Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 382 F. Supp. 143, 145 (E.D. Mich. 1974). The
district court interpreted the section to require that individuals wait sixty days after filing
state complaints before giving the Secretary notice of intent to file suit. This interpretation
is unsupported by the language of the section.
I" The legislative history supports this interpretation. See Vazquez v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (D.P.R. 1975), citing Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 830 and S. 788, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
48 (1967) (testimony of Secretary Wirtz).
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sixty days to act before a federal suit could be brought. If the com-
plainant is genuinely interested in obtaining the state remedy, he
will work with state officials. The aggrieved individual would not be
required to file his federal notice of intent to sue for 300 days after
the alleged violation;'38 he could rely exclusively on state law for that
period. Section 633 of the ADEA can therefore be sensibly inter-
preted as designed to encourage states to develop age discrimination
laws that can "compete" effectively with the federal law.
Interpreting section 633 to make the filing of a state complaint
elective raises a question about the scope of section 626(d)(2) of the
ADEA.19 This section provides that "in a case to which section
633(b) of this title applies," the ADEA complainant has 300 rather
than 180 days in which to file his notice of intent to sue in federal
court. The Sixth Circuit has held that in order to qualify for this
expanded filing period, two conditions must be met: first, the state
in which the complainant resides must have a state age discrimina-
tion in employment law; and, second, the state must have an agency
expressly authorized to grant or seek relief under the law. 4 ' If these
are the only conditions on the expanded filing period, individuals
residing in states with such laws and agencies would enjoy an arbi-
trary procedural advantage over those individuals who reside in
states without age discrimination in employment laws. It seems
unlikely that this is the result intended by Congress. The preferable
interpretation of section 626(d)(2) is that a third condition musf be
met in order to make section 633(b) applicable: the individual must
have elected to commence state proceedings. This allows individu-
als to use available state remedies without jeopardizing their federal
rights, but does not give an unnecessary benefit to individuals who
bypass state laws and proceed directly to the federal procedures.'
CONCLUSION
The problems of interpretation that have arisen in connection
' 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970); see note 9 supra.
"' 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (1970); see note 9 supra.
" Eklund v. Lubrizol Corp., 529 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1976).
" Where the individual has filed a state complaint, the sixty-day deferral period, like
the sixty-day notice of intent to sue requirement, limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
If an individual attempts to file suit before the end of the state deferral period, the courts
should adopt the "suspended animation" doctrine developed under Title VII to deal with
complaints filed prematurely with the EEOC. Under this doctrine, a complaint is referred to
the state authority. At the end of the sixty-day deferral period, the complaint is treated as
automatically filed with the federal agency. This practice was upheld under Title VII proce-
dures in Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
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with the procedural requirements of the ADEA can be satisfactorily
resolved only by analyzing the functions of those requirements in
the Act, a method suggested by the Supreme Court as appropriate
for construing statutory time limits, and profitably applied to the
ADEA problems in Dartt v. Shell Oil Co. The requirement that
notice of intent to sue be filed with the Secretary of Labor within
180 days after the alleged discrimination occurred effectuates the
overall purposes and remedial scheme of the Act if understood as a
statute of limitations and therefore subject to equitable modifica-
tion. The federalism provision of the Act does not require com-
plaints to be filed with state authorities, but when such complaints
are filed, the federal courts have no power to entertain suit under
the Act until sixty days have expired from commencement of state
proceedings. Finally, section 626(d)(2) of the Act should be inter-
preted to afford an expanded filing period only to individuals who
have filed initial complaints with appropriate state authorities.
These interpretations respond to the need for an efficient procedural
mechanism without jeopardizing the substantive rights and federal-
ism concerns that underlie the statute.
Andrea Waintroob
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